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cosponsor of these bills at the next printing of the bills.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXTENSION OF TIME FOR SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 6 TO REMAIN AT THE DESK

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senate Joint Resolution 6 be kept at the desk until the close of business on Friday, January 15.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILLS, ETC.

Under authority of the orders of the Senate of January 6, 1965, the following names have been added as additional cosponsors for the following bills and concurrent resolution:

S. 1. A bill to provide a hospital insurance program for the aged under social security, to amend the Federal old-age, survivors, and disability insurance system to increase benefits, improve the actuarial status of the disability insurance trust fund, and extend coverage, to amend the Social Security Act to provide additional Federal financial participation in the Federal-State public assistance programs, and for other purposes: Mr. KENNEDY of New York and Mr. MONROONEY.

S. 21. A bill to provide for the optimum development of the Nation's natural resources through the coordinated planning of water and related land resources, through the establishment of a water resources council and river basin commission, and by providing financial assistance to the States in order to increase State participation in such planning: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YARBOROUGH.

S. 22. A bill to promote a more adequate national program of water research: Mr. BIBLE and Mr. TOWER.

S. 23. A bill to direct the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a program in five areas of the United States to increase usable precipitation, and for other purposes: Mr. DOMINICK, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YARBOROUGH.

S. 24. A bill to expand, extend, and accelerate the saline water conversion program conducted by the Secretary of the Interior, and for other purposes: Mr. BIBLE, Mr. LONG of Missouri, Mr. MOSS, Mr. TOWER, and Mr. YARBOROUGH.

S. 288. A bill to amend Public Law 874, 81st Congress, in order to provide assistance to local educational agencies in the education of children of needy families and children residing in areas of substantial unemployment with unemployed parents: Mr. LONG of Missouri.

S. Con. Res. 2. Concurrent resolution to establish a Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress: Mr. FANNIN, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JORDAN of Idaho, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MONDALE, and Mr. SYMINGTON.

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF NOMINATIONS BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I desire to announce that today the Senate received the nomination of Maurice M. Bernbaum, of Illinois, to be

Ambassador to Venezuela; and Wymberley DeR. Coerr, of Connecticut, to be Ambassador to Ecuador.

In accordance with the committee rule, these pending nominations may not be considered prior to the expiration of 6 days of their receipt in the Senate.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED

The Secretary of the Senate reported that on today, January 12, 1965, he presented to the President of the United States the enrolled joint resolution (S.J. Res. 3) extending the date for transmission of the budget and the Economic Report.

ADDRESSES, EDITORIALS, ARTICLES, ETC., PRINTED IN THE APPENDIX

On request, and by unanimous consent, addresses, editorials, articles, etc., were ordered to be printed in the Appendix, as follows:

By Mr. CARLSON:

Statement by James Blakely, of Topeka, Kans., at presentation of 24th National Bellamy Award Flag to the Wausau, Wis., Senior High School.

By Mr. INOUYE:

Speech entitled "Free Enterprise, America's Heritage," delivered by Eagle Scout John I. Kotake, at Honolulu, Hawaii, on November 5, 1964.

By Mr. RANDOLPH:

Editorial from the Spirit of Jefferson-Advocate, of Charles Town, W. Va.

By Mr. METCALF:

Excerpt from article entitled "America's 10 Outstanding Young Men of 1964," paying tribute to John Artichoker, Jr., superintendent of the Northern Cheyenne Agency, published in Look magazine for January 26, 1965.

By Mr. FULBRIGHT:

Article entitled "Little Rock Women's Panel Wages War on Prejudice," written by Matilda Tuohey, and published in the Sunday Arkansas Gazette of December 27, 1964.

APPROVED STATEMENTS ISSUED BY SENATE AND HOUSE MINORITY LEADERS

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, on Monday, January 11, the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, which has been operating as a joint group throughout the 87th and 88th Congresses, and which continues into the 89th Congress, approved statements issued by the two minority leaders.

I ask unanimous consent that they be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statements were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR DIRKSEN

When defeat comes to a major political party in this country invariably there are outcries for revolutionary changes in party structure, party leadership, and party policies. The Republican defeat of 1964 has produced these manifestations of uncertainty, unrest, and uneasiness. Many suggestions, both formal and informal, for action pour from numerous sources.

We, the members of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, are fully cognizant of the situation. There is no doubt

in our minds that action is indicated and we are taking it. In our conversations since the November defeat we have discussed among ourselves and with other recognized party leaders, numerous paths that might be followed. Always, certain basic facts have emerged:

First, that the only elected Republican officials of the Federal Establishment are the 32 Republican Members of the U.S. Senate and the 140 Members of the House of Representatives. Obviously and beyond dispute, they will guide Republican Party policy at the national level, in the absence of a Republican President and Vice President, by the record they write in the Congress. It is their responsibility.

Second, that an additional repository of advice and counsel on party policy exists in former Presidents and nominees for President, in our present elected Governors, in the members of the Republican National Committee and the State chairmen of our several States, and, of course, in active Republican advocates at all other levels of the party structure. Their wisdom must be channeled into party policy formulation.

In the conviction that the Republican Party for a century has been and is an essential element in this Nation's forward progress, and with the firm belief that all Republicans must join the effort, we, the members of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, have on this day initiated a proposed mechanism to achieve a broad consensus on vital objectives for our country and our party. It is an honor to introduce my colleague, the new Republican leader of the House, JERRY FORD, to provide the details of the proposal.

STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE FORD

We propose to give the Republican Party a unified leadership. As a chart we are making public will show, we are inviting the five living Republican nominees for President—one of whom, Dwight D. Eisenhower, served two terms in that office—and representatives of the Republican Governors Association to join with us in the establishment of a Republican Coordinating Committee to continuously examine party policy and party operations.

We have asked the presiding officer of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, the Republican National Chairman, Mr. Dean Burch, to serve as presiding and administrative officer of the new Republican Coordinating Committee, and through the Republican National Committee to provide such staff assistance and funds as may be necessary. As Mr. Burch, himself, suggested, we regard this role an implicit responsibility for him or whoever may occupy his office in the future.

It will be the function of the Republican Coordinating Committee, composed of the 11 members of the joint Senate-House Republican leadership, the five living Republican nominees for President, and five representatives of the Republican Governors Association to facilitate the broadest party representation and the establishment of task forces for the study and examination of major national problems and issues. The recruiting sources for these task forces, which would report to the joint leadership, are clearly delineated on the organization chart which we are making public.

For the joint leadership, I have been asked to add these two pertinent points: First, the Republican National Chairman has been requested to immediately invite the other participants to join us in forming the Republican Coordinating Committee. Second, we are convinced that the Republican Party is not only a great force in the American way of life, but it is the only living political instrument which can make the American dream a reality, not a mere collection of words and promises. Our only goal is results and we intend to achieve them.

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INTERVIEWS OF SENATOR CHURCH
CONCERNING VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, recently, the Senate appointed the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator CHURCH has made an excellent statement with regard to what our policy should be in southeast Asia.

I ask unanimous consent that this statement, together with a number of editorials from the New York Times of December 28, 1964, the Evening Star of Washington, December 30, 1964, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch of December 30, 1964, the Salt Lake Tribune of December 31, 1964, the Idaho Statesman of December 18, 1964, and the New Britain Herald of December 28, 1964, be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement and editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From Ramparts magazine, January—February 1965]

INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR FRANK CHURCH

I think that if there is a basic fault with our Asian policy, it might well be our failure to confine it to the practical limits of our power. We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. Afterward, the Pacific was a very broad moat protecting the United States against hostile encroachment. Had we established, as our westernmost rampart, the island chain which rims the Asian continent, and had we made it clear that we were prepared to meet—with our own military force—any hostile penetration of the Pacific, we would have established a boundary line fully within our military power to maintain. The United States is essentially a naval and aerial power, and there is no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific. The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea nor the eagle from the sky. But it is also true that neither the whale nor the eagle can drive the elephant from his jungle. I think our failure to establish such an island rampart, conforming to the character of our military power, has been a fundamental cause for some of the difficulties that now face us in Asia.

Question. Senator CHURCH, you would restrict American intervention to the defense of this string of islands. Is that correct?

Answer. That might have been our posture, but it has not been.

Question. If you are going to limit the line like that, how can you justify our presence in Korea, which is on the mainland?

Answer. I think that we were right, in the first instance, to intervene in Korea. An invasion by North Korea had occurred, and we undertook, in the name of the United Nations, to defend the independence of South Korea against that invasion. Many other countries joined us, at least in a token way, to uphold the U.N. shield against an aggression of this kind. Our mistake was not in undertaking the defense of South Korea, but in having remained there afterward longer than required. Today, for example, there still are 55,000 American troops on the 38th parallel. From all appearances, they are permanently entrenched as though the 38th parallel had become an American boundary, and this, despite the fact that the South Korean Army has been equipped as a modern military force, nearly twice as large as the North Korean Army which faces it. There is no military necessity for so large a continued American presence along the 38th parallel, and I think that we would give added credibility to our oft-spoken purpose of leaving Asia for the Asians if we were to commence to withdraw American forces from Korea.

Question. There are some who argue that even though the North Korean forces are much smaller, there is the vast army of Red China just across the Yalu River. From that point of view, wouldn't it seem advisable to keep American troops in there?

Answer. If we were to accept that premise, then it would follow that American troops must remain permanently on the 38th parallel so long as Red China endures. I think that this is a faulty argument. It may lead China, North Korea, and other Asian countries to conclude that we are, in fact, interested in maintaining some kind of permanent foothold on the Asian mainland. Remember, we have a large and mobile military force on Okinawa, within easy striking distance of Korea, should another invasion ever occur. Moreover, we could, if necessary, leave a single regimental combat team, rather than two full divisions, on the line in Korea, which would be a sufficient "trigger force" to guarantee our renewed participation in the defense of South Korea, if the need were ever to arise again. But, no matter how one looks at it, there is no military requirement for keeping a whole American Army there indefinitely, in view of the present strength and capacity of the South Korean Army to defend their boundary line.

Question. If there is no military need for the 55,000 troops, is there a possibility that there is a political need?

Answer. The only political reason for maintaining so large an American army there would be to assist in buoying up the weak South Korean economy. But this is, in itself, an admission of the failure of American policy in Korea. Twelve years after the end of the war, South Korea is still a garrison state, incapable of self-support, and each year it is necessary for the United States to give South Korea close to half a billion dollars in rations. We can't continue indefinitely to finance the South Korean nation and yet, we seem unable to find an alternative to this dole.

Question. Senator CHURCH, returning to the matter of the island string, what about our being in Formosa? Is this compatible with traditional American policy in Asia?

Answer. Of course, we are not in Formosa with a whole American army as we are in Korea. I think we were correct in giving formal assurances to Formosa that we will defend her against Communist attack. Our commitment extends not only to the island of Formosa, but the Pescadores as well. I would view these islands as a part of the ocean rampart I previously mentioned, and well within the American military capacity to defend. Our 7th Fleet is, indeed, the shield for Formosa. My only criticism of American policy in Formosa is that we have helped to finance the maintenance of an army for Chiang Kai-shek, which is twice too big for the needs of the island's defenses and not a tenth big enough to retake the mainland. So the policy has been unduly costly for us, and at the same time, may well be giving China cause to suspect that we are preparing Chiang Kai-shek to act as a spearhead for an invasion of the mainland. I do not regard this as our objective, but it may seem so to the government of Red China.

Question. It might seem, from the two instances of South Korea and Formosa, that we are trying to preserve an American grip upon Asia. Do you think Asians so view the situation?

Answer. It disturbs me that we may well be creating such an impression even though this is not, in fact, our objective. We fully understand the importance of credibility when it comes to our military forces. We take great precautions to make certain that our nuclear deterrent is a credible one in order to avoid a nuclear war through enemy miscalculation. But we seem to give precious little attention to making our diplomatic objectives credible. I think we have, to some

degree, committed this error both in South Korea and Formosa.

Question. The dilemmas we seem to have vis-a-vis South Korea and Formosa appear to find their ultimate expression in the situation in South Vietnam. Wouldn't you agree, Senator?

Answer. Yes, I think that's so. And here again, it is a fact that we are in South Vietnam only because the Communists refuse to let the Saigon government alone. If they were to call off the insurrection against that government and leave South Vietnam and her neighbors alone, we'd be only too willing to withdraw our forces from that region of the world. Nevertheless, it may not seem this way to many Asians. I remember spending some months in India during the Second World War. I had the opportunity to talk to Indian intellectuals and revolutionaries. They made a sharp distinction between me, as an American, and my English friends. They understood that the United States had been the first colony to achieve its independence from George III. They had read our Declaration of Independence; they could quote passages from Thomas Paine, from Thomas Jefferson and from Abraham Lincoln. But once I left their company and went out onto the great flatlands of India itself, and encountered ordinary Indian people, it was apparent from the way they treated all Americans, that they made no distinction between us and the British. We were all white men. To them, we all represented Western imperialism. I'm afraid that in South Vietnam today, there are a great many of the indigenous peoples who make little distinction between our American uniforms and the old French uniforms, and therefore, we are once again faced with the problem of making our position in Vietnam credible to the Asian people with whom we must deal.

Question. Then that raises probably the most fundamental question of all. Should we have gone into South Vietnam in the first place?

Answer. Looking back upon it, I would say that Mr. Dulles was mistaken when he persuaded President Eisenhower that we ought to intervene in South Vietnam after the French defeat. After all, the French had fought for years with an army of some 400,000 men in a vain effort to preserve French Indochina, and that proud army was defeated by ragged guerrilla forces which could not be overcome. Nevertheless, we did make that decision and we now have to live with it.

Question. Thus far, the Saigon government has not been able to win the war. Do you think that the war can ever be won?

Answer. I really don't know. I think that we have to continue to honor our commitments to the Saigon government to make sure that it has all of the weapons, the equipment, food, and financial assistance needed to carry on the war. We have given such help in massive quantity, and I think that we must continue to do so.

But in the end, the capacity of Saigon to win the war will depend on the cohesiveness of public support that can be achieved. Some political stability will be essential. The people themselves must have the will to continue the fight. For nearly 20 years now, fighting has been going on in this unhappy region of the world. The people are weary of war. If the spirit to fight is preserved, we can provide the material aid necessary, and the war eventually can be won. To do this, I think South Vietnam must be sealed off from supplies from the north, both over the jungle trails and from the sea. But in the last analysis, victory or defeat will depend upon the South Vietnamese people themselves. The thing we must remember is that there is no way for us to win their war for them. It is a guerrilla war, at root an indigenous revolution against the existing gov-

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ernment, the kind of war where it's exceedingly difficult to tell the enemy from the people. It can only be won by the people themselves.

Question. When you say seal off supplies to the Vietcong from North Vietnam and from the sea, are you implying that the South Vietnamese have sufficient military capability to do this?

Answer. I think that it's possible for them to accomplish this militarily, particularly if we can bring about a joint military effort in Laos which will interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail. It's possible, also, that we can find a role for the United Nations to play in maintaining the integrity of the boundaries in this area.

Question. Isn't it true that a lot of the warfare is being waged by captured American arms, with the result that the insurrectionists are already rather self-sufficient?

Answer. Yes. It isn't well enough understood that the war in the south cannot be won in the north, even though it would be helpful to cut off the supply lines which continue to give aid and comfort to the Vietcong. Basically, the Vietcong consists of South Vietnamese; the bulk of their weaponry is captured, and they have the capability of maintaining their attacks, independent of North Vietnam. Therefore, it's folly to think that, by extending the war northward, there is a way out for us. All one needs to do is to look at the map to see that this is the way in, not out, and that the war can be more easily won, not by taking on the whole North Vietnamese army, but by confining it to the 25,000 hard-core Vietcong that are involved in the south. If they cannot be put down by the Saigon government, with all of the aid and assistance we are giving it, then our predicament will only be worsened by extending the war northward and increasing the enemy force many times.

Moreover, let us remember that, within the past 2 years, China invaded India. Also, it was Red China that came down from the north when she felt herself threatened by approaching American troops in Korea. Thus, there is little basis for us to assume that China might not respond in like fashion to Vietnam, if the war were to be extended northward. Then, we would have the whole of the Chinese army to contend with as well, and we would be faced with a tragic trail of casualties in this region of the world, out of all proportion to the vital interests of the United States.

Question. Assuming that South Vietnam could be insulated and assuming further that we kept pouring in more and more supplies, what should be the policy of the United States if this effort failed nonetheless, and the war in South Vietnam could not be won?

Answer. I would hope that we could then find the maturity to accept that fact. France did so, both here and in Algeria. Algeria, incidentally, meant a great deal more to the economy of France than Vietnam does to ours. Besides, Algeria was for many years considered a part of France where more than a million Frenchmen lived. When, in the end, the French Government found that there was no way to put down the insurrection against it, that the will for independence in Algeria was irresistible, the statesmanship of De Gaulle made it possible for the French to recognize the inevitable and to make a peaceful settlement in Algeria. This involved a French withdrawal.

Now, South Vietnam has never been, nor do we want it to be, an American possession. It is alien to the United States in almost every way, and it is as remote from the United States as any country in the world. If, despite all of its material advantages, the Saigon Government can't prevail, because it simply lacks the indigenous support of the

people of the country, then I would hope that we would recognize that it is not our country and never has been. The war is there for them to win or to lose. If it is lost and there is no way left to win it, we should accept that fact.

Question. And by that, do you mean that we should withdraw our support?

Answer. I think in that event, withdrawal would be forced upon us, for the Vietnamese themselves would form some kind of government which would invite us out. I hope it never comes to that, but we must be prepared for that possibility.

Question. Wouldn't it be possible, even before that time, for the United States to make certain diplomatic moves to support the French proposals advocating neutrality for all of southeast Asia? Wouldn't that bring about a resolution of the problem, particularly as it wouldn't require withdrawal in the face of defeat?

Neutrality for all of southeast Asia, for the whole of that great peninsula, is a proper objective, providing that it is not a camouflage for a Communist takeover. If we were able to sustain the Saigon government sufficiently long to permit it to win its war, or if we were to stabilize the situation in this region in such a way that it would be possible to go with some trump cards to the conference table, then I think we might reach an international agreement, declaring this whole region to be neutral, and requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops. We could guarantee the integrity of that agreement with our own military power. If it were violated by invasion from China or any other country, we could commit ourselves, along with the other nations joined in the international accord, to the maintenance of its integrity.

Question. That would only guarantee territorial integrity from external aggression. How would that help in terms of internal insurrection?

Answer. The only answer to Communist subversion, burrowing from within a country, is to be found within that country itself. If its government is a decent one and enjoys general popular support, the internal Communist problem can be successfully dealt with. Malaya is a good example. There, a few years ago, Communists undertook the same kind of guerrilla war against the Malayan Government as South Vietnam is plagued with today. The same tactics were used. The same dedicated, hard-core revolutionaries were at work and, too, there was a very large Chinese population in Singapore which might have given shelter and support to the Communist activity. Yet, Malaya was able to deal with this problem, to isolate the Communist guerrillas from the rest of the population, and to stamp out the insurrection.

Malaya had the kind of government that enjoyed the confidence and support of the people. The thing for us to remember is that, unless the people themselves are willing to rally behind their government, unless they regard a Communist insurrection as a menace to their own well-being, there is no way that American forces can intervene to save the day. If we move in and take over in an effort to thwart the impending success of a Communist insurrection, the Asian peoples involved will forget entirely our good motivation, and will come at once to regard the war as one between a white Western force on the one hand, and indigenous Asian forces on the other. And there is no way for us to win such a war on the Asian continent.

We have to recognize that the period of Western occupation and control in Asia is gone. It is now Asia for the Asians. Nothing would be more futile than to permit ourselves to be sucked into a war which would pit Western forces against Asian forces, for even if we were able, by brute musclepower,

to take a large chunk of Asian territory, we could not stay there long. Our only harvest would be implacable hostility on all sides and the tides of history would, in the end, wash over us. No lasting victory could be achieved.

Question. Everything you say seems to fit the situation in South Vietnam at the time that we are talking. We have had, in the last year or two, any number of regimes in South Vietnam, plus a war that seems to be hopelessly bogged down. Is it because of the failure of the Saigon government, or I should say governments, to fulfill the needs of the people?

Answer. I think that the Government in South Vietnam has been incompetent, to say the least. It must be viewed for what it is, a military despotism. Communist North Vietnam is also such a despotism, but this hardly gives the people of South Vietnam a clear-cut choice between free government and tyranny. Nor should we think of this war in terms of preserving a free economic system against the imposition of a Socialist system, for the fact is that both the Governments are committed to socialism.

Question. Taking into consideration everything that you've said so far about our policy toward Asia, don't we face a rather difficult future now that China is a nuclear power?

Answer. Yes. The situation will become increasingly difficult once China has a nuclear arsenal. Of course, the recent detonation of a nuclear device is significant in terms of prospects, but the ultimate significance will be realized, say, about 10 years from now when the Chinese will probably have an effective nuclear arm. This would change the power balance in Asia immensely, and China might well seek to use her newfound power to establish a hegemony over southeast Asia, where China has traditionally enjoyed a sphere of influence. I would hope, by then, that we will have drawn our lines in strict conformity with our vital interests, so that we never find ourselves faced in southeast Asia with the dilemma that confronted Khrushchev in Cuba, when he was compelled to withdraw under highly humiliating circumstances, simply because his gamble was not worth the candle. When it comes to nuclear confrontation, countries must make their stand conform to their mortal interests. The stakes must be absolute, for the consequences are too terrible to permit the frivolous commitment of nuclear weapons.

Question. In other words, once China has atomic capability, any South Vietnam situation would be almost certain to end with the humiliation of having to withdraw or face a nuclear threat from virtually next door. Is that what you are implying, Senator?

Answer. Yes. Unless we look ahead and undertake now to revise our policy in Asia, we could face such a debacle some time in the future.

Question. Assuming that China will have a nuclear capability in the foreseeable future, does this automatically imply that China is going to take over all of Asia?

Answer. I wouldn't think so. Chinese divisions decisively defeated the Indian troops defending India 2 years ago, but China recognized that the conquest of India would not only strain her own resources to the limit, but would also result in greater problems for her than solutions, and, therefore, elected—having shown her capabilities—to withdraw her forces once more. In the event that China establishes her own nuclear arsenal, it is much more likely that she will seek to create a sphere of influence in southeast Asia, similar to the one the old Chinese emperors once enjoyed, which would leave other countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos somewhat independent, even

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though these countries may become Communist in name. The important thing to remember is that there is now an unraveling within the Communist world. It isn't all one great Red dominion as it appears on the maps. Today, even those who would regard it this way, concede that there are at least two Romes, and Moscow and Peking grow increasingly hostile. Moreover, in Eastern Europe we see the satellite countries asserting their independence in more and more obvious ways, striving with some success to loosen the Russian grip upon them. The point is, that the same unraveling process is likely to occur in Asia as is now occurring in Europe, and that these satellite countries will become increasingly independent of domination from either Peking or Moscow. Thus it will become more and more possible for us to establish our separate relationships with them, as we are even now doing in the case of both Poland and Yugoslavia.

One final question: vis-a-vis South Korea, Formosa, and South Vietnam, we seem to be in a position that can best be described as involvement. If the world situation changes or the war, for example, in South Vietnam cannot be won, how can we prepare ourselves as a nation, psychologically and politically, for a change from involvement to disengagement?

It's especially hard for a free, popular government to change course. We have a tendency to oversell our policy with respect to any given country in such a way that public opinion hardens behind it, and then it becomes very difficult to change course. I think we have to find the statesmanship to do this. It's possible that we have swung on the pendulum of public opinion, from the extreme of isolationism 30 years ago, when the prevailing opinion in this country was that it didn't matter to us what happened abroad, to the opposite extreme where we regard it as an American responsibility to maintain the governments of all those countries that are now nominally non-Communist. This, in a sense, is an imperial attitude, even though we seek no possessions, and even though we are not attempting to impose American rule upon any of these countries. However, unless we come to accept the fact that it is neither within the power nor the interest of the United States to preserve the status quo everywhere, our policy is doomed to failure. Here again, the requirement for statesmanship is very high, but if we strive to inform the American people of the upheaval and ferment of our times, and if we give them all the facts, I think the American people will be prepared to support a flexible foreign policy, better tailored to serve the real interest of the United States in a changing world.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 28, 1964]

A FRESH VOICE ON VIETNAM

Senator FRANK CHURCH, in his interview with the liberal Catholic magazine, *Rampart*, as said publicly what many U.S. officials are saying privately about Vietnam. Mr. CHURCH argues that the United States should never have got in in the first place and, while there is no immediate way out, the ground should be laid for ultimate extrication.

The tough line Washington is taking in regard to the military purge of the South Vietnamese National Council would indicate a belief that General Khanh's position is not strong as he has made it out to be. His defiance of a few days ago has now been tempered by a warm Christmas message to the U.S. forces expressing "grateful appreciation" for what the Americans are doing.

This represents no assurance, however, that General Khanh will yield to American demands. The political crisis in Saigon gives many signs of being beyond repair. It can be papered over or it can be held down forcibly by the military, but so long as the Buddhists refuse to cooperate and oppose both the war

against the Vietcong and American aid to wage it, no solution to the Vietnamese crisis can offer much real hope.

Senator CHURCH deserves to be heard, not only because he is a thoughtful voice but because he has been right in the past on Vietnam. In the autumn of 1963, when Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were giving out optimistic reports on the Diem regime, Mr. CHURCH was publicly skeptical and critical. He now argues that "neutrality for all of southeast Asia is a proper objective, providing that it is not a camouflage for a Communist takeover." Senator MANSFIELD, the Democratic majority leader, has taken a similar line; but his colleague, Senator MONSEY, returns from an Asian tour convinced that neutrality would be a mistake.

The proviso of keeping the Communists out is all important. The basic objective of the United States in southeast Asia is what was called "containment" in 1954. The American aim was to stop the Communists from taking over all Vietnam, and that is still our objective. A true neutrality would serve that purpose, but it is unrealistic to think that weak nations on the fringe of Communist China can preserve a Swiss-type of neutrality. A Yugoslav-type, perhaps, but then the definition of neutrality would have to be stretched.

As Senator CHURCH points out in his *Rampart* interview, a number of Democratic Congressmen are dissatisfied with the present policies toward southeast Asia. The dilemma is that no one has an alternate course to suggest that does not involve the enormous risks of an expanded war or an abandonment of all our commitments in the area.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Dec. 30, 1964]

SENATOR CHURCH CALLS FOR CAUTION

(By Max Freedman)

Senator FRANK CHURCH, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, deserves the highest praise for speaking so frankly, in his interview with *Ramparts* magazine, about the situation in Vietnam.

He has not ignored the hazards and humiliations that now face the United States; but he has not advocated the abandonment of South Vietnam to Communist domination as an easy way for the U.S. Government to escape from its growing difficulties.

He is ready to support military aid to South Vietnam while its rulers and people are willing to fight for their freedom. The test of this willingness is to be provided not by the wishes of Washington but by the actions of Saigon.

One of the great misfortunes of the United States entanglement with Vietnam has been the lack of clarity in defining long-term purposes. Perhaps CHURCH is right in blaming the late John Foster Dulles for making Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia so important to U.S. security. But CHURCH surely will agree, on reflection, that the blame cannot be carried by Dulles alone. The Dulles initiative took place as long ago as 1954. The U.S. absorption with the affairs of Vietnam has continued steadily.

Our military, economic, and emotional commitment seemed to grow more intense as our failure to control events became more evident. President Kennedy did not reduce former President Dwight Eisenhower's commitment, he increased it; and President Johnson is under growing pressure to increase that commitment still further.

During all these years there has been no critical protest in Congress, except by a few notable Senators, at this enlargement of U.S. risks and responsibilities. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara discouraged open debate. They preferred to testify before secret congressional committees. As the war continued to go badly, there was a growing reluctance

to challenge U.S. policy in Congress. Responsible Members wished to do nothing that would endanger U.S. security or weaken the fighting resolve of the hard-pressed Vietnamese Government.

But CHURCH is not alone in thinking that continued silence imposes greater risks on the United States than a responsible challenge that will force this country, at a calamitously late hour, to answer some hard questions about its purposes in southeast Asia.

In his interview, CHURCH has discussed some of the first principles of U.S. policy that should have been fully examined years ago. In essence, he has asked two basic questions. Has the United States made the best use of its limited resources in the Pacific? And has the United States assumed more responsibility in southeast Asia than can be justified by its own national interest? Not everyone will agree with CHURCH's answers, but there will be wide agreement with his contention that the present policy cannot be continued without the gravest risks for this country. He is even more opposed to launching a war on North Vietnam.

CHURCH will no doubt take the first opportunity in the new session of Congress to amplify his proposal for giving the United Nations special duties for protecting a neutralized southeast Asia. He recognizes, what President Charles de Gaulle, of France, has failed to admit, that these neutral borders would soon fall under Communist control unless they were placed under some kind of supervision and protection. This means that outside countries would have to assume economic and military duties in southeast Asia, under the guidance of the United Nations, to prevent a Communist attack and to assure the people of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that their national independence would remain intact.

This theme, and similar proposals, will be taken up by CHURCH and other Democratic Senators in the new Congress. They do not want to embarrass the Johnson administration. They want to save the country from mistakes and perils in Asia that can yet be avoided. The somber misfortunes in Vietnam assure that their criticisms and suggestions will be more favorably considered by the public now than in the past.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1964]

A SENATOR ON VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH, of Idaho, made perceptive comments on U.S. policy in South Vietnam in an interview published in *Ramparts* magazine. He is one of a small group of Democratic Senators who have shown growing uneasiness over the course of events in Saigon, and there is a belief in Washington that a major discussion of foreign policy may be in the making.

Senator CHURCH believes the United States must continue to honor its commitments; he does not advocate an immediate end of U.S. economic and military support for the floundering Vietnamese Government. He thinks the United States should not have picked up the burden of the defeated French in Indochina in 1954, but he recognizes that the problem is not to deplore the past but to decide what to do about the present and future.

The Senator, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, advocates neutralization for southeast Asia as a fair objective of U.S. policy, and he hopes that the United Nations can be brought into the picture as a guarantor of national boundaries. He also hopes the United States will never be forced to withdraw, but he thinks "we must be prepared for that possibility."

Anyone who reads the dispatches from Saigon must share that feeling. The Communist rebels now are reported to control three-

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fourths of South Vietnam and half the people; there have been six upheavals in the Saigon government in the last 14 months. If the South Vietnamese are to have any bargaining power in a move for a new Geneva conference or some sort of U.N. intervention there is no time to lose—if, indeed, there is any time left. A U.N. presence would be desirable, but since Red China, not a U.N. member, would have to participate in guarantees, there are many complications.

Senator CHURCH is right when he says we must find the statesmanship to change our course, and must accept the fact that "it is neither within the power nor the interest of the United States to preserve the status quo everywhere." We have failed to distinguish the difference between our vital national interests and our emotional commitments. A constructive debate in this field might serve the Nation well.

[From the Salt Lake City Tribune, Dec. 31, 1964]

ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IN VIETNAM POLICY

Amid the uneasiness and the welter of suggestions as to U.S. policy in the long, drawn out war in South Vietnam, one of the newest voices is that of Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, who is becoming somewhat of a foreign policy figure in the Senate.

In a recent magazine article, Senator CHURCH recommends the neutralization of all southeast Asia and suggests that a role be found for the United Nations as a guarantor of national boundaries in that area.

Along with several other prominent members of the majority party, Senator CHURCH is showing the restiveness that many Americans feel about the Government policy in Asia generally and in South Vietnam in particular.

SOME FAVOR WITHDRAWAL

Senators ERNEST GRUENING, of Alaska, and WAYNE MORSE, of Oregon, have favored withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam now while Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, the majority leader, has indicated support for the neutralization of South Vietnam only.

Another Democratic Senator, GEORGE D. McGOVERN, of South Dakota, has proposed a 14-nation conference to seek a political settlement.

It is clear that the new Congress convening next month will stage a major foreign policy debate and that possibly the heaviest opposition to the administration's policies may well come from Democrats.

Senator CHURCH's recommendations deserve careful study. If the kaleidoscopic changes of the government in South Vietnam continue at the pace they have in recent months and if the most powerful figures, militarily speaking, such as Gen. Nguyen Khanh, continue to mutter about U.S. interference while demanding astronomical aid for a war which is far from won (and, it seems from all dispatches, pursued desultorily by the Vietnamese), then it may not be a bad idea to throw the whole matter into the hands of the Security Council of the United Nations.

ASSEMBLY'S VIEW

The U.N. General Assembly would, of course, view the Vietnam struggle as a "colonial adventure" by the United States, thanks mainly to the new and excessively touchy nations of Africa and Asia.

But, the Security Council could take up the matter and possibly work out a solution which, while it may not satisfy all conditions of both sides in the dispute, could at least bring the whole southeast Asian question into the world forum, relieving this country of the odor as well as the actuality of dictating to the unstable politicians in Vietnam.

One problem in the U.N. Security Council, of course, would be the veto power of the

Soviet Union. However, it is not impossible that, due to the rift with the Red Chinese, the Russians would refrain from vetoing U.N. action in Vietnam.

FOLLY TO ESCALATE

In his magazine article, Senator CHURCH declared that it would be folly to escalate the present military operations into North Vietnam because such an expansion of the fighting would inevitably bring Communist China into the war.

This is probably true for Peiping is much more aggressively doctrinaire than Moscow and assumes the mask of protector against white colonialism all over the world with an unctuous which only deceives those who wish to be deceived.

Yet the complete and immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces and aid from South Vietnam would be a massive loss of "face" in the Asian world (although what "face" is left is certainly bruised and bloody).

So, the Senator from Idaho may have an acceptable solution for the Vietnam dilemma which President Johnson and his advisers would do well to examine closely.

[From the Boise (Idaho) Statesman, Dec. 18, 1964]

CHURCH VIEWS THE FAR EAST

In the current Catholic laymen's magazine, *Ramparts*, Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, gives an interview, stating: "I think that if there is a basic fault with our Asian policy, it might well be our failure to confine it to the practical limits of our power."

The Senator, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, looks back and pinpoints mistakes: "We conquered the Pacific in the Second World War. Afterward, the Pacific was a very broad moat protecting the United States against hostile encroachment. Had we established, as our westernmost rampart, the island chain which rims the Asian Continent, and had we made it clear that we were prepared to meet—with our own military force—any hostile penetration of the Pacific, we would have established a boundary line fully within our military power to maintain."

That lengthy sentence sets the theme for a present-day critique of our policies in the Far East. Senator CHURCH finds the United States still a major naval and aerial power with no way for the landlocked forces of Asia to drive us from the Pacific.

"The elephant cannot drive the whale from the sea nor the eagle from the sky," CHURCH philosophizes with his usual eloquence. "But it is also true that neither the whale nor the eagle can drive the elephant from his jungle."

The Senator "might" restrict American intervention to the defense of this string of Pacific islands. How does that theory fit in with our presence in South Korea?

He answers that the United States was correct in intervening in Korea, but erred in remaining there long after "our presence was no longer required." He finds no military necessity for so large (55,000 American troops) a continued presence along the 38th parallel and "I think we would give added credibility to our oft-spoken purpose of leaving Asia for the Asians if we were to commence to withdraw American forces from Korea."

The Idahoan would retain an American regiment in South Korea. He believes the present South Korean Army could defend alone their boundary line.

Senator CHURCH views the Island of Formosa and the Pescadores as being part of the ocean rampart he has delineated.

As to South Vietnam, he thinks that possibly former Secretary of State Dulles was mistaken in persuading President Eisenhower to intervene after the French defeat. The Senator notes that France had an army of

some 400,000 men fighting in a vain effort to preserve French Indochina.

The Senator declares the United States must continue to honor her commitments to the Saigon government, to make sure it has all the weapons, equipment, food, and financial assistance necessary to carry on the war. He is concerned about a lack of political stability, a certain amount which will be necessary for the South Vietnamese to pursue their Communist invaders.

"To do this," CHURCH said, "I think South Vietnam must be sealed off from supplies from the north, both over the jungle trails and from the sea. But in the last analysis, victory or defeat depend upon the South Vietnamese people themselves."

The Senator is critical of the South Vietnam Government, recalls its incompetency and views it as a military despotism. "Communist North Vietnam is also such a despotism, but this hardly gives the people of South Vietnam a clearcut choice between free government and tyranny."

In other matters, Senator CHURCH considers the Far Eastern situation more complex with Red China on the way toward becoming a potential nuclear power. But he is not forecasting that Red China will take over all Asia. He cited the Chinese invasion of India and the decisive defeat which the Indian army suffered. "But China recognized that the conquest of India would only strain her own resources to the limit."

The Senator is correct when he acknowledges no sure way for resolving the Far East conflicts. His remarks in *Ramparts* were scholarly and thought provoking. There is no easy way out. The United States must stand by its commitments and continue to work for the cause of freedom.

[From the New Britain (Conn.) Herald, Dec. 28, 1964]

DISINVOLVEMENT

A popular, young Senate Democrat who is widely respected in both political parties had some things to say in a just-published magazine interview which ought to set a lot of Americans to thinking.

Senator FRANK CHURCH, of Idaho, writing in the *Rampart* magazine, a Catholic layman's publication, expresses the view that the United States ought to be setting its sights on getting out of southeast Asia. He doesn't think that we, as a nation, ever should have been in there in the first place.

What makes the Senator's view worthy of more than passing comment is that it is a position widely talked about privately in Washington, seldom publicly.

His view is not simply a throwback to isolationism. It is, rather, a carefully conceived attitude which calls for gradual reduction of all foreign involvements throughout Asia, and as a substitute therefore, guaranteed maintenance of national boundaries through the United Nations.

In Vietnam, in particular, Senator CHURCH feels that continuation of the present course of guerrilla involvement is folly, leading nowhere. He believes that escalation of the war would likewise be futile, leading to dangerous possibilities. The United States, he feels, ought to be making plans for gradual elimination of its troops from South Vietnam.

Likewise, he feels that continued maintenance of the Korean truce line by American troops is a situation which could go on as long as China is under a Communist government.

The important part of his thesis is that he would not simply have the United States withdraw and create a power vacuum. Rather, the United Nations would become the guarantor of peace in that far-off continent.

The American people would not be unhappy to learn of some alternative to the Vietnam situation which does not call for

expansion of the war or abandonment of our commitments to the people of Asia.

[From the Lewiston (Idaho) Morning Tribune, Dec. 21, 1964]

ANOTHER SETBACK IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Another military putsch, the latest in a long series, has brought new upheaval to the Government of South Vietnam, illustrating again the dilemma that faces American policymakers in Asia. American troops are in South Vietnam to support the government in a civil war with the Communist-backed Vietcong rebels, but there is no real government to support.

In its latest show of force, the military junta which rules South Vietnam dissolved the National Council, the country's legislature, and set about arresting many of its members. The civilian premier, Tran Van Huong, seems not to have been deposed, and the chief of state, Phan Kac Suu, was evidently still in power Saturday night. This doesn't mean a great deal, however, since it is clear that the military chiefs could depose either of them whenever they wished. The situation does not encourage confidence in the ability of the government to secure the country against rebellion, and so long as the government remains helpless there is little the United States can do to help it save itself.

South Vietnam has been without an effective government since the French were forced to pull out. At no time have the South Vietnamese people felt a national identity with the government, and so it has been a simple matter for the Communists to stir up trouble in the villages. Senator FRANK CHURCH, Democrat, of Idaho, discussed the problem in an interview published in this newspaper yesterday. The only answer to Communist subversion, burrowing from within," Church said, "is to be found within that country itself. If its government is a decent one and enjoys general popular support, the internal Communist problem can be successfully dealt with * * *. The thing for us to remember is that, unless the people themselves are willing to rally behind their government, unless they regard a Communist insurrection as a menace to their own well-being, there is no way that American forces can intervene to save the day."

This is why Church, Senator WAYNE MORSE, and some others in and out of Congress now consider American policy in Vietnam fruitless. We are caught in a civil war on the side of a government which is barely functioning and we find ourselves unable to avoid taking sides in a religious conflict between Buddhists and Catholics. What is worse, as Senator CHURCH pointed out, we are white people fighting against Asians in Asia, and in the eyes of many Asians simply carrying on where the French left off. And our position there deteriorates with each new demonstration of the government's incapacity to govern.

DEDICATION OF ARKANSANS TO THE ARKANSAS RAZORBACK FOOTBALL TEAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, the people of Arkansas are warm, friendly, and lighthearted about most matters, but on one question we are deadly serious. Where the Arkansas Razorbacks football team is concerned, Arkansans have a dedication not unlike that of the most fervent true believer.

As the only non-Texas team in the Southwest Conference, we have the formidable prospect each fall of playing seven Texas football teams; and as everyone knows, Texas football players, like

most things from that State, come pretty big.

In less prosperous times when Arkansas teams had all they could do to stay in the league, Arkansas fans displayed the dogged devotion which many believed to be the peculiar possession of New York Mets followers. However, like all things in Arkansas, the Razorbacks in recent years have steadily risen the ladder of success. This year this devotion was repaid. We reached the top. Last week the Razorbacks, who won 10 in a row in the regular season and defeated Nebraska in the Cotton Bowl, were announced as the winner of the Grantland Rice Award as the No. 1 team in the country.

All of Arkansas is very proud of the team which was not as ponderous as its opponents and did not have any superstars in the lineup but which played each game as a team and with steady improvement. Much of the credit for the team's success must go to the student body of the university and to the people of the State who have given the Razorbacks solid support. But to Coach Broyles must go much of the credit for having given the essential training and having created the spirit in both the players and the public.

Having played a little football at Arkansas some 40 years ago, I can truthfully say this year's team is one of the best ever, possibly the best—at least since my last year on the squad.

To my colleagues from Texas I cannot offer much hope for the future. All reports indicate that our freshman team is better than ever.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article from last night's Washington Star about the selection of the Arkansas Razorbacks to receive the Grantland Rice Award be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AWARD COMPLETES ARKANSAS DREAM—IRISH SECOND IN RICE VOTE

HONOLULU.—"I'm prouder than I've ever been in my life," said Coach Frank Broyles Wednesday on learning that his unbeaten, untied Arkansas Razorbacks will receive the Grantland Rice Award.

The memorial to the late sports-writing great goes to the team rated No. 1 in the United States by a five-man committee representing the Football Writers Association of America.

"This is something I know the people of Arkansas have dreamed about for a long time," he said. "I know that this has to be the proudest moment in the athletic history of Arkansas—for the players, the university, and our fans."

"They all rank No. 1," Broyles said.

Arkansas, the Southwest Conference champion, defeated Nebraska, 10 to 7, in the Cotton Bowl game for an 11 to 0 record. Arkansas was the only major college football team without a loss.

SECOND IN ASSOCIATED PRESS POLL

The Razorbacks finished second in the final Associated Press football poll, which was released before the bowl games. Alabama, No. 1 in the last poll, lost in the Orange Bowl to Texas, which was defending national champion and No. 1 when it lost by a point to Arkansas.

The Razorbacks received four first-place votes and one for third. Notre Dame was runner-up with five second-place votes. Texas had one first-place vote and one third-place vote for four points and Michigan received three third-place votes for three.

Alabama received no votes for first, second, or third place.

The five-man committee was composed of Si Burick, Dayton News; Fred Russell, Nashville Banner; Blackie Sherrod, Dallas Times-Herald; Steve Weller, Buffalo Evening News, and Paul Zimmerman, Los Angeles Times.

HULA BOWL COACH

Broyles is here to coach the South squad in the Hula Bowl game, which has been won every year by the North.

"The award is a great reward for this Razorback team," he said. "The players dedicated themselves to this end after our victory over Texas."

"It required hard work, tremendous leadership and unselfishness," Broyles said. "They improved steadily each week and climaxed the season with a championship drive in the Cotton Bowl against an outstanding Nebraska team."

"We received the greatest support of any team in America from our students and fans throughout the State," he said. "I think it's wonderful for our squad and the State. We had such great effort all year long. I'm as excited as everybody in Arkansas is."

CAN THE STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS?

Mr. CARLSON. Mr. President, State governments face what is probably the worst fiscal crisis in their history.

Most State legislatures meet in odd-numbered years. Before 1963 had ended, no less than 35 State legislatures had passed tax increases, estimated to raise annual collections by \$1 billion.

The revenue sources in many instances are in direct conflict with Federal taxation.

In 5 years 1958-63, State and local tax rates rose twice as fast as Federal taxes.

State and local taxation is now increasing twice as fast as income.

Since World War II Federal debt has gone up only 20 percent—State and local debt has gone up six times or 600 percent.

John Anderson, former Governor of Kansas, and past chairman of the Governors' conference, has written a very outstanding article on the problems of Federal and State taxation. This article appeared in the January 9 issue of the Saturday Review. I ask unanimous consent that it be made a part of these remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CHALLENGE OF PROSPERITY: CAN THE STATE LIVE ON CRUMBS? WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WASHINGTON CUTS INTO THE PIE OF LOCAL REVENUE?

(By John Anderson)

The choices which Americans must make over the next 2 or 3 years concerning the critical question of Federal-State fiscal relations will greatly affect the future nature of the Federal system. The best way to begin a consideration of Federal and State fiscal relations is to sort out the salient facts about Federal, State, and local governmental revenues and expenditures. Some of these facts are startling and all of them have serious implications for the future. (By "serious"